Exiting the Columbia University’s Graduate Faculties in 1981, my long-pursued degree in hand, I was ready for the next step. At that time, the start of my career, my sole aim was to teach and do research in the field of international relations. I could not even imagine anyone suggesting that I might end up in the halls of the U.S. government, in the mountains of Afghanistan, in Iran, or in any other unusual place. Yet the academic phase turned out to be but one facet of an unusual path.
One of the many fascinating aspects
of a career full of surprises, and at times of dangerous situations, were the
people with whom I came into contact. Some were well-known and in high
positions, some not so high. Some were courageous and principled, some with
blood on their hands. Some with whom one would not wish to be alone in a dark
alley and some who died violent deaths.
In this article, I will attempt to
draw a small picture of the early part of my career and focus on one prominent
personality who played a significant role on both the national and
international scene – and in my own activities.
Being a student in Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s graduate class at Columbia University in the early 1970s was an
experience in itself. That such an experience would become a friendly
relationship well into the late 1980s was one of the many unexpected
developments in a career long in surprises.
“Zbig,” as he was often referred
to, was a well-known political scientist of Polish origin, who served as
President Carter’s National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981 and was one of
the main architects of the historic Israel/Egypt peace treaty. He was also an adviser
to the White House during the Reagan and George W.H. Bush administrations. An
expert on the Soviet Union and Communism more generally, he was a brilliant and
demanding professor. His lectures were delivered at a rapid clip, and if one
was not prepared ahead of his lectures, it was difficult to keep up with the tight
substance.
I developed a good relationship
with him early on, much before there was any inkling he might become the
National Security Adviser; he was my doctoral dissertation adviser in its early
stages. I had decided to use my dissertation to explore in depth matters of
importance to me, and I was still working on my “magnum opus” by the time
Brzezinski came back from the White House and our relationship resumed.
One day, he met me in the hallway
near his office and called me over: “I have an article about me from an Israeli
newspaper by Menahem Begin. Could you please translate it for me? I am curious
to know what he says.” With some trepidation, I read the piece: What if the Israeli
Prime Minister had written something not altogether complimentary?
Professor Brzezinski had played a
key role in the Camp David Accords, negotiated under President Carter, which
produced the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. Thankfully, Prime
Minister Begin had written a very positive and complimentary piece. Zbig was
pleased, and I breathed a sigh of relief.
I had no idea at the time that the
relationship with Dr. Brzezinski would soon take a very different form – with
him back in academe, and me inside the Pentagon. Not long before completing my
PhD, I had accepted a position in the Political Science Department at Yeshiva
University. With my focus on international relations, however, it seemed to me
that gaining some “practical” experience in foreign/defense policy might provide
a solid benefit to my teaching and research – wherever I would be. So, by the
beginning of the Reagan Administration, I decided to apply for positions in the
various U.S. National Security Agencies.
As I didn’t know anyone in
Washington, my only option was to fill out applications and hope something
would turn up – not usually the way to get a job in government! The probability
of success was low. Yet, after only a few weeks, I received a call from the
Pentagon that a U.S. Air Force general wanted to see me for an interview. Even
such an innocuous event did not occur without some drama: my flight ended up
being delayed by a bomb threat! And this was in 1982, before such events became
a regular feature.
My arrival at the Pentagon was met
with understanding for the minor drama that had preceded it. In any case, some 10
minutes into the interview, I was offered a position in the International
Security Policy organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, under
the stewardship of Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. Known as
“Darth Vader,” or the “Prince of Darkness” in liberal circles due to his strong
anti-Communist stance, Perle had been a key aide to Democratic Senator ‘Scoop’
Jackson prior to coming to the Pentagon. Mine was a position low on the
bureaucratic “totem pole” of an organization dealing with arms control, the
Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.
I had no idea then that such an
interlude would be far from temporary and would lead to some very drastic
changes in my career.
Looking back on those times, I
wondered to what I had owed that unusual way of getting the position. My job
involved countering Soviet propaganda against the deployment of U.S.
intermediate range missiles (INF) in Western Europe to neutralize the Soviet
threat.
Aside from – or, more accurately,
as part of – the obvious siata d’Shmaya, I am convinced that having Brzezinski,
who had just been National Security Adviser to the President of the United
States, as my main reference must have played an important part.
Some six months into my first year
at the Pentagon, I found myself catapulted from my low position to find myself
working directly for Richard Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense. I had
managed to ensure early on that he would see my work. He was therefore familiar
with it and liked it. He also had become aware of serious issues I was having
with an official some layers above me. He called me into his office and, in
essence, told me we could deal with the problem in one of two ways: through the
bureaucratic route, which would be long and painful, or, he said, “Why not just
come and work in the front office?”
So, there I was, from one day to
the next, having jumped over a number of bureaucratic layers, reporting
directly to one of the most important officials of the Defense Department.
My new position opened a whole new
set of opportunities. It allowed me access to a variety of prominent and
high-level personalities. It was also what made reconnecting with Brezinski a
logical step.
As importantly, it allowed me to
get involved in matters that I thought deserved far more attention than they
were being given at the time. Key among those was the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The ongoing brutal Soviet intervention was to my mind a far more
critical national security issue than was recognized at the time. A Soviet
victory, or defeat, it seemed to me, would have major consequences for both the
United States and the Soviet Union. The war was also a human tragedy of
enormous proportions, with Afghans being massacred in large numbers.
A Russian victory would
substantially bolster Moscow’s influence in the Third World and put Washington
in a far more difficult strategic position. A Soviet defeat, on the other hand,
would have an even greater impact in weakening the Soviet Union, and would correspondingly
strengthen the U.S. position in the world. In the end, the Soviet defeat was
one of the two major factors precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Empire –
the other being Reagan’s “Star Wars” initiative (space defense).
The American reluctance to provide
more adequate assistance to the Afghan resistance was due to two main factors: Historically,
the country had never been of any interest. Secondly, the U.S. Department of
State was far more interested in restoring good relations with the Soviet Union
than in doing anything about the invasion.
By the end of 1982 and into1983, Afghan
resistance leaders had begun to plead their case with Americans. I was one of
those to whom they turned and whom they came to know as a determined supporter
of their cause. (This is how I became personally acquainted with the key
figures in the Afghan government following the U.S. direct intervention there
after 9/11.)
Publicizing the critical nature of
the situation as both a vital humanitarian and strategic foreign policy issue would
in turn facilitate the greater assistance needed. I realized that a useful
vehicle for this would be Congressional hearings. To that end, I developed
connections with a number of congressmen, senators, and their staffs. The
objective was to convince them to have hearings on the subject. I was involved
in a number of such initiatives. I would approach senators and/or congressmen
and their staffs – the staffs were key, especially for implementation – who
were interested and willing to get actively involved. Once they were onboard
and had agreed to hold hearings, they would often ask me to identify and recruit
respected and prominent personalities as witnesses. I would then offer to talk
to the possible candidates to convince them to testify.
It also happened more than once
that witnesses asked me to suggest or even write their statements. And on the congressional
side, I would often be asked to suggest the questions. Also, either the senator,
the congressman or, more often, their staff would ask me to suggest the
witnesses they should call on. In one instance, I had suggested then-Under
Secretary of Defense, Fred Ikle. Once they had requested him to testify, he, in
turn, called me in and asked that I write the statement he would make. As he
was one of the officials I interacted with daily, he knew me well and quite
possibly was aware that I had had something to do with the hearing happening in
the first place.
For one of those hearings, I asked
Zbig to testify, explaining the issue and the importance of his being a key
witness. He accepted. Like the staffs of the congressmen/senators, witnesses,
and other key people, I sat in the back of the room. As Dr. Brzezinski sat down
following his testimony, he turned to me and asked, “So how did I do?”
Another story can further
illustrate our relationship. Once, long after I had left the Pentagon, a
Central Asian ambassador to the UN with whom I was on friendly terms called to
ask if I could get him in to see Dr. Brzezinski. He explained that Brzezinski’s
secretary had said this would not be possible. Could I perhaps do something?
When I called, his secretary answered. Dr. Brzezinski was not in, and yes, she
said, she had gotten a call from that ambassador’s office and, she added, her
boss did not have the time to meet him. I explained that the ambassador was a good
person, a friend of mine, and would she please convey to her boss that I
thought it would be worthwhile for Brzezinski to meet with him. Sometime soon
after, the ambassador called to thank me for the good meeting he had.
It was rare for Brzezinski to not
ask my opinion on Israel whenever we would meet. In one of those times, if I
recall correctly sometime in 1987, he suddenly said, “What do you think about
Israel?”
“What do you mean?” I said.
“Well, their negotiating rigidity. They
can’t possibly hold on for long to the West Bank; they need to make
concessions!”
Before I could utter a word, he
launched into additional criticism, further detailing how counterproductive
Israel’s stance was.
At a pause, I asked, “Did you want
to have my take?”
“Yes, yes, absolutely!”
I said, “Let me address this in
three parts: One, as you know, I am an Orthodox Jew. We believe that in the
end, we will succeed. You need not share that belief or agree, but this is
nevertheless a factor in the equation. Second, at every turn since and even
before the rebirth of Israel as a state, people have said it would not last or
succeed. That assessment was based on a single factor analysis and was repeatedly
proven wrong. Thirdly, at Camp David, Israel gave back everything – all the
land they had taken – to Egypt in exchange for a piece of paper (the
Peace Treaty)! So, when we talk about rigidity, we should look at the Arab
side!”
I thought this was a particularly
apt point to make, especially since he had been one of the treaty’s key
architects.
“Yes, that’s true” he said,
followed by some not overly complimentary words about the Arabs’ actual
rigidity.
Somehow, I don’t think that his
mind was definitively changed on the subject, but the point needed to be made. And
it is one that now, more than ever, needs to be repeated – again and again. Our
duty is to do what is right. The results, we should also know, belong to the
Almighty. And to do what is right means improving ourselves – each and every one
of us – to act with courage according to our precepts, and to pray to Hashem
that He should continue to help us and bring us to the ultimate resolution of history,
the Ultimate Redemption.
Dr. Krakowski is President of EDK
Consulting and a past contributor to the Where What When. He is a former US Defense
Department official and professor of International Relations and Law.
